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This paper identif ies implications for economic policies of basing Poverty Reduction 
Strategies on the ambitious, long-term framework of the Millennium Development Goals. 
One of its main objectives is to open up the dialogue on the policy content of Poverty 
Reduction Strategies and promote greater policy choice for national policymakers. With 
regard to fiscal policies, it argues for an increased emphasis on raising domestic 
revenue—along with a renewed stress on achieving vertical equity—and financing 
extensive public investment programmes, which, contrary to obstructing private 
investment, are essential to raise its productivity. The paper also counters the view that a 
large influx of Official Development Assistance will necessarily appreciate a country’s 
exchange rate and make its exports less competitive. If countries lack the ‘absorptive 
capacity’ to effectively disburse development assistance, the paper claims that resources 
should be directed, early on, towards developing such public sector capacity. Also, the 
paper contends that monetary policies should accommodate expansionary, investment-
focused fiscal policies and thus be targeted to real variables, such as economic growth, 
not just inflation. With regard to financial policies, the paper maintains that because of 
the failures of unfettered liberalization to stimulate growth or reduce poverty, the public 
sector should provide support to specialized institutions, such as rural banks and 
development banks, which can promote long-term investment and provide equitable 
access to financial services. In addition, the paper contends that although privatization 
has been given unqualified donor support, it has a mixed record, and is particularly 
unsuccessful in providing equitable and affordable access to essential public services. 
The paper concludes that if ‘Second-Generation’ Poverty Reduction Strategies are based 
on MDGs, they should have economic policies that are less fixated on macroeconomic 
stabilization and more geared to accelerating growth with equity and promoting long-
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Recent efforts to strategically link PRSPs to MDGs are beginning to dramatically alter 
international assessments of poverty reduction strategies and pro-poor economic policies. 
By calling for big increases in external and domestic resources to meet the MDGs, the 
U.N. Millennium Project has contributed to this re-assessment. It has helped stimulate a 
new global debate, in particular, on the need for more expansionary public- investment led 
economic policies (www.unmillenniumproject.org). Meanwhile, a broad range of UNDP 
regional initiatives in Asia-Pacific and the Arab States and country studies in the 
Caucasus/Central Asia and Africa are confirming the need for more pro-growth and pro-
poor economic policies (www.asiapropoor.net; www.undp.org/poverty/propoor.htm; 
McKinley 2003). 
There is no alternative to ambitious MDG plans: many developing countries desperately 
need a quantum leap in resources, sustained consistently over a decade or two. Yet PRSP 
economic policies remain short sighted, obsessed with price stability. Inflation jitters 
constantly trump policies for growth and development. To reach the MDGs, economic 
policies have to be bolder and more expansionary. Fiscal policies should be focused on 
substantially scaling up public investment, financial policies geared to channelling 
considerably more lending to productive private investment and mo netary policies 
reshaped to target, not just inflation, but also real economic variables, such as increases in 
incomes and jobs and big reductions in poverty (McKinley 2004a,b,c,d). 
Based on comprehensive national assessments of meeting basic human needs, the 
Millennium Project has called for substantially larger ODA contributions to many 
developing countries, especially in Africa (Sachs 2004). This necessarily involves 
making PRSP objectives much more ambitious. Such an injection of funds should rapidly 
scale up public investment in physical and social infrastructure. But a sizeable share 
should be targeted, upfront, to enlarging ‘absorptive capacity’—i.e., each country’s 
ability to effectively disburse these monies for development purposes (Nebie 2004). 
Otherwise, national ownership of poverty reduction strategies will be sacrificed in the 
process. Thus, central to this campaign is a major agenda of national capacity 
development. 
To avoid long-term aid dependence, governments also need to mobilize more domestic 
resources: boosting revenue or borrowing domestically, if necessary, for public 
investment. This aspect is too often neglected. Another big priority: reform domestic 
banks to mobilize more savings (which is in short supply in many countries) and motivate 
them, through various means, to direct lending to long-term private investment and 
poverty reduction (Chandrasekhar 2004). Boosting savings and investment is a centrally 
important long-term development objective (overriding the undue importance attached to 
keeping inflation low and re-allocating available resources more efficiently). 
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With more revenue, governments should mount a large-scale public investment 
programme to spark growth and meet basic MDG-related human needs. The prevailing 
deficit phobia needs clinical treatment. As long as current revenue covers current 
expenditures, governments can usefully borrow to finance such investment. This is 
standard practice for private corporations. Why not for governments? Fiscal deficits 
should remain sustainable as ensuing growth boosts revenue collection (Weeks and Roy 
2004).  
 
The resultant growth of productive capacities will keep inflation moderate—namely, 
within a 15 per cent rate per year. MDG-compatible monetary policies should avoid 
afflicting the human pain—big drops in income, jobs and essential public services—
required to squeeze inflation, unnecessarily, below five per cent (Epstein 2003 and 
Chowdhury 2004). Along with more pragmatic inflation targets, Central Banks should 
adopt real targets consistent with the MDGs, such as halving income poverty and hunger.  
To do this, Central Banks should support fiscal policies that accelerate real GDP growth 
and job creation, instead of being obsessed with macroeconomic stabilization. 
 
Blaming a Lack of National Absorptive Capacity:  
A Lame Excuse for Holding Back Needed Foreign Aid 
 
The U.N. Millennium Project, led by Jeffrey Sachs, has begun “needs assessments” of 
low- income countries in order to determine the increases in investible resources that they 
require to reach the Millennium Development Goals (Sachs et al. 2004). The Project has 
done very rough estimates of the costs involved for Africa, the continent where recent 
progress has been slowest. For this continent, the sums are not large compared to what 
the United States spends on military and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The rough estimate is $100 per person per year (Sachs 2004). While such an estimate can 
provide only a rough order of magnitude, it does suggest the scope of the additional effort 
that is required. 
 
The Millennium Project estimates that mobilizing domestic resources will contribute $40 
per person. So external resources have to contribute the other $60 per person. Since ODA 
already contributes $10 per person in Africa, the remaining requirement is $50 per 
person. This is a quintupling of present ODA levels.  
 
Other estimates call for smaller increases in ODA (UN 2001, Devarajan et al. 2002). 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the costs remains substantial. In stark contrast, the 
resource demands made by Poverty Reduction Strategies, which are supposed to be the 
chief vehicle to achieve the MDGs in low-income countries, are much more modest and 
short-sighted. They plan usually for only three years and end up requesting only for ODA 
levels that donors are currently willing to provide.  
 
If donors regard PRSP requests for funding as too ambitious, they make sure that these 
requests quickly become more ‘realistic’. But in this case, realism is defined by what the 
donors are willing to contribute, not by a country’s genuine needs for assistance. Focused 
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more on macroeconomic stabilization than growth and development, PRSPs often call for 
“’belt tightening’ for people who cannot afford belts” (Sachs 2004, p. 4). 
 
One of the most common excuses that donors give for not substantially increasing their 
assistance is that countries lack the “absorptive capacity” to disburse such large new 
sums of money. In some cases, this is certainly not true: adequate capacities do exist. In 
many countries, donors contribute to the problem by over-burdening national capacities. 
Aid management systems are geared to donor requirements, not national priorities and 
are often run parallel to government structures. As a result, government capacities are 
weakened, not strengthened. In addition, donors often place multiple, diverse and 
uncoordinated demands on governments—even when they co-finance the same project. 
Governments often have difficulty in complying with complicated donor procedures, 
which, to make matters worse, frequently change, along with donor staff and policies 
(Nebie 2004). 
 
In those cases where national mechanisms are, in fact, lacking to disburse development 
funds, the priority for donors should be to rectify this condition, instead of lamely using 
such a problem as an excuse to hold back funding. Building up absorptive capacity 
involves increased expenditures, particularly during the early stages, on personnel and 
governance institutions and increased investments in a foundation of social and physical 
infrastructure.  
 
Another common donor excuse for holding back aid is that its substantial increase will 
cause a “Dutch Disease”, i.e., an appreciation of a country’s exchange rate and a 
consequent loss of international competitiveness. But the short-run effects of increased 
aid inflows on a country’s exchange rate ignore their potential longer-run effects on 
expanding an economy’s productive capacity.  
 
Donors contribute to macroeconomic problems if their aid is short-term and 
unpredictable (DfID 2002). This causes volatility in prices and the exchange rate. In the 
short term, large inflows of aid will tend to appreciate the exchange rate and raise prices, 
principally by raising demand for non-tradable services and goods. The appreciation of 
the exchange rate signifies that the prices of non-tradables (e.g., food crops, construction 
work and public services) rise relative to the prices of tradables (e.g., items that are 
customarily exported, such as cash crops, and imported, such as machinery). The 
competitiveness of a country’s export sectors might suffer as the costs of their non-
tradable inputs rise faster than the prices of their outputs on the world market.  
 
Over the medium term, the effect of aid can be much more positive provided that it is 
used productively—and the higher level of aid is sustained (DfID 2002). If it is sustained, 
governments can then afford, in the short term, to ‘sterilize’ the increased aid inflow by 
selling some of the additional foreign exchange to the private sector or issuing domestic 
debt. Both of these measures decrease the money supply (by drawing domestic currency 
out of the private sector) and thereby relieve upward pressure on prices. However, 
governments that insist on maintaining inordinately low prices will tend  to ‘over-
sterilize’ (draw too much money out of the private sector) and undercut the potential for 
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using aid to finance increased public investment and stimulate more private investment. 
This is a clear and present danger for those governments wedded to strict ‘inflation 
targeting’.  
 
In the short term, governments should not allow the appreciation of the exchange rate to 
destabilize the economy. This is likely to happen if the exchange rate is left to ‘freely 
float’, namely, left completely subject to market forces. Instead, governments should use 
the exchange rate as a short-run policy instrument. They should adopt a ‘managed float’ 
approach, intervening in the market through the buying and selling of domestic currency 
in order to provide some measure of short-run stability. This will allow the potentially 
more positive medium-term effects of ODA to take effect. 
 
Governments could use increases in ODA to lower domestic taxes or domestic debt but 
neither of these options is likely to have a powerful impact on increasing domestic 
investment and productivity. Moreover, many low- income countries need to generate 
much more tax revenue, not less. They also need to build up more effective financial 
institutions. Even if interest rates were lowered as a result of lowered public debt, the 
private sector is unlikely to borrow more funds for investment if the supply of credit 
remains low, or is geared mostly to short-term lending (such as for working capital).  
 
The best use of ODA is to finance public investment, such in physical and social 
infrastructure or in the restructuring of institutions, such as the banking system, that can 
galvanize private investment. In economies with under-utilized capacities—a 
characteristic of most low- income countries—such investment is unlikely to cause more 
than a moderate increase in inflation. At the same time, a positive supply response is 
likely to be rapid (because new capacities do not have to be immediately created).  
 
This is likely to be the case for both the non-tradable and tradable sectors. Increased 
public investment can improve the production of non-tradables, such as providing rural 
roads to increase food crops in rural areas. This could have a powerful direct impact on 
poverty. Such investment could also have a longer-term impact on the non-tradable sector 
through financing education and health. Public investment can also boost the production 
of exportables, such as through providing a more efficient energy infrastructure for urban 
manufactures. This could boost export competitiveness and revenues (Adam and Bevan 
2003).  
 
While appreciation of the exchange rate might dampen exports in the short term, the 
productivity effects of public investment can augment exports over the medium and long 
term. These potential effects imply that if ODA is used for public investment that is 
targeted to increasing the productivity of labor and capital, the net effect on incomes and 





MDG-Based Poverty Reduction Strategies:  
Home Grown Rather Than Imported 
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are supposed to be the main vehicle in low-income 
countries to attain the MDGs. They are also supposed to be ‘home-grown’, ‘nationally 
owned’ strategies. But their economic policies, which are the foundation of poverty-
reducing growth, have to be based on conditionalities agreed with the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Hence, there is widespread scepticism that these 
policies are genuinely ‘home-grown’. This ‘tension’ between externally imposed 
conditionalities and ‘national ownership’ of PRSPs has been recognized by recent IMF 
and World Bank evaluations (World Bank 2004a, IMF 2003 and 2004). 
 
Unfortunately, national ‘ownership’ of such strategies is a donor preoccupation rather 
than a government objective. Governments are being urged, in effect, to adopt, “as their 
own,” policies introduced by outside agencies—without real policy autonomy in 
designing home-grown strategies. If there is reluctance to do so, or a lack of enthusiasm 
in the process, donors should not be surprised.  
 
PRSPs still have to be approved by the Executive Boards of both the IMF and the World 
Bank. Yet the position of these two institutions and many international donors continues 
to be—in apparent contradiction—that PRSPs should be nationally driven strategies. 
Furthermore, the donor community has agreed to align and harmonize its operations 
with the PRSPs—based on the dubious assumption that they are, indeed, nationally 
owned. 
 
National empowerment and lender conditionalities are inherently at loggerheads. Part of 
the problem is that the conditions imposed by international development lending 
institutions on national policymaking have proliferated (Buira 2003). Conditionalities 
have spread to cover all important economic decisions and many structural policies, 
social measures, governance reforms and, last but not least, anti-poverty strategies 
themselves. Despite recent efforts by the Bretton Woods Institutions to reduce or 
‘streamline’ conditionalities, their predominance still hampers the development of 
national autonomy.  
 
If PRSPs were genuinely home-grown, they should reflect a diversity of national 
approaches. However, they are remarkably uniform (Stewart and Wang 2003 and 
Oxfam 2004). This uniformity is most evident in their macroeconomic policies, which 
are rarely subject to national dialogue or debate during the period of PRSP formulation 
(Vos 2004).  
 
The IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, which sets most macroeconomic 
policies for borrowing countries, should be based on the PRSPs. But the reverse is 
usually the case. Because most PRGFs have been negotiated before PRSPs, they have 
not benefited from national dialogue and debate, in which various policy options could 
be evaluated. The PRGF macroeconomic framework has been imported virtually 
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without change into many PRSPs. And national policy autonomy has suffered as a 
consequence.  
Since governments have tailored their policies to satisfy external priorities, it is no 
wonder that PRSPs exhibit little variation. In recognition of this problem, the World 
Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department has recently recommended that the World 
Bank should “reduce or eliminate uniform requirements and foster better customisation” 
of PRSPs to country circumstances (World Bank 2004a, p. xiii). It has also noted the 
problem of lack of national ownership, maintaining that the World Bank Executive 
Board’s “review of the PRSP appears redundant, as well as attenuating ownership in the 
eyes of most stakeholders” (World Bank 2004a, p. xvii). 
 
For the same reasons, the IMF evaluation recommends that emphasis be shifted from 
“the production of documents to the development of sound domestic policy formulation 
and implementation processes” (IMF 2004, p. 15). Governments have produced 
standardized documents because they have shared the same motivation, namely, to 
obtain concessional financing and debt relief. Thus, it is better to strengthen national 
policymaking capacity than directly tie financing to the approval of documents. 
 
In light of this problem, the international donor community should focus greater efforts 
on fostering national empowerment in formulating poverty reduction strategies, 
especially Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). As impartial, grant-based 
institutions with close relations to governments and expertise in capacity development, 
U.N. agencies, particularly UNDP, are well placed to promote national policy 
autonomy. In campaigning for the MDGs, they promote globally accepted goals. They 
do not impose prescriptions on how to achieve them. 
 
In fostering participatory discussion and debate on the MDGs and how to ‘upscale’ 
PRSPs to reach the 2015 targets, it is important, in particular, to foster national policy 
choice. This is a critical enabling condition for national policy autonomy. The recent 
World Bank and IMF evaluations both make this point. The World Bank evaluation 
states, for example, that the Bank should “encourage PRSPs to explore a wider range of 
policy options, including those aimed at enhancing growth” (World Bank 2004, p. xiii). 
The IMF Independent Evaluation Office is more forceful in its assessment: “the PRS 
process has had limited impact in generating meaningful discussions, outside the narrow 
official circle, of alternative policy options with respect to the macroeconomic 
framework and macro-relevant structural reforms” (IMF 2004, p. 7). 
 
Regrettably, the PRSP evaluations of both the World Bank and IMF give little attention 
to linking PRSPs to MDGs. The current debate on the nature of the PRSPs should 
clearly centre on how to align their policies with the MDGs. This implies that the PRSPs 
have to graduate from focusing on short-term stabilization policies to promoting long-
term development options based on a dramatic upsca ling and deployment of resources, 
both domestic and external.  
 
Both the World Bank and IMF are beginning to recognize the need to help revamp the 
nature of PRSPs but they still concentrate unduly on trying to reconcile national 
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concerns about larger and more predictable aid flows with donor concerns about the 
effective use of such increased aid (i.e., ‘absorptive capacity’). But the IMF evaluation 
does note that “the present ‘architecture’ of the PRS approach does not provide a clear 
framework for helping countries and donors decide what is an appropriate medium term 
resource envelope in which macroeconomic strategy should be derived” (IMF 2004, p. 
21). This acknowledgement opens up space for a potentially productive dialogue on the 
scale of ODA—and domestic resources—necessary to convert the PRSPs into effective 
strategic vehicles for reaching the Millennium Development Goals. It also opens up the 
debate on the nature of MDG-consistent macroeconomic strategies. 
 
Low, Unfair Taxes: A Major Roadblock to MDG Progress 
 
Many governments in developing countries will have difficulty in reaching the MDGs 
because of a lack of revenue to invest in growth and reduce poverty. Strikingly, their 
central strategies, the PRSPs, remain modestly resourced. Even debt relief has provided, 
so far, only a modicum of financial relief. 
 
Small government and low taxes are not the answer for reaching the MDGs: governments 
need to raise more domestic revenue as well as allocate it more effectively. Having the 
rich pay their fair share of taxes is part of this campaign. Tax systems should be more 
equitable as well as more efficient. They often put the burden, however, on low-income 
households and let the rich off the hook with a host of loopholes, exemptions and 
deductions. The poor should not pay proportionately more taxes than the rich nor should 
they receive proportionately fewer public benefits. As long as inequitable systems of 
public finance continue, can PRSPs be successful in uprooting poverty? The answer: only 
marginally, at best. 
 
The domestic revenue base of most developing countries is too small, not too big. The 
main problem is the lack of tax revenue. For all developing countries, tax revenue, as a 
ratio to gross domestic product (GDP), is less than half the level of industrial countries 
(i.e., 18 per cent versus 38 per cent) (Tanzi and Zee 2001). In poor countries, such as 
Bangladesh, Guinea, Madagascar, Nepal and Yemen, total tax revenue is only 10-11 per 
cent of GDP, or less. See Table 1 for data on a few selected countries that illustrate this 
point.  
 










Tax Revenue as % 
Of GDP 
2002 
Bangladesh 7.0* India 9.9 
Chad 7.2 Madagascar 11.3 
Congo, Rep. 10.5 Nepal 9.6 
El Salvador 10.0 Sudan 6.6* 
Georgia 10.4 Uganda 10.8 
Guinea 11.2* Yemen 9.3* 
Source: World Development Indicators 2003, 2004b. Table 5.6. Note: ‘*’ signifies 2001. 
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A pervasive ‘small-government ideology’ hides the reality that governments are starved 
of resources, unable to adequately finance many essential public services. Poor 
households end up as the main losers. While directing more money to pro-poor 
expenditures is part of the answer, raising more funds is also critical—but frequently 
neglected. 
 
Standard tax reforms do not provide the answer. Trade liberalization has significantly 
reduced trade taxes—a big source of revenue for many poor countries. Their replacement, 
the Value-Added Tax (VAT) on consumption of goods and services, has failed in many 
cases to recoup the losses (Weeks and Roy 2004). Part of the reason is the demands that 
such a tax places on administrative capacity. Also, such a tax is often regressive because 
the poor consume more of their income than the rich. Hence, even if the tax rate were the 
same for all, it would deal a heavier blow, relatively, on the consumption of the poor.  
 
If tax reformers place such an emphasis on the VAT, they should put a priority on 
making it more progressive. At least food or the other essential consumption items that 
dominate the spending of poor households should be exempted. And higher rates should 
be imposed on luxury items consumed by the rich. High excise taxes on items such as 
automobiles and consumer durables could complement the VAT and contribute to a more 
equitable system. Yet it is difficult to design consumption taxes that are both progressive 
and effective. 
 
Because of their bigger impact on richer households, direct taxes tend to be more 
progressive than indirect taxes. However, tax reform remains riveted on indirect 
consumption taxes and pays little attention to direct taxes. Vertical equity—namely, 
obliging those with greater ability to pay tax to contribute a larger share of their income 
or wealth—has become, unfortunately, an archaic principle of taxation. There are obvious 
political economy reasons for abandoning vertical equity as a guiding principle of 
taxation. The rich have the political power to push for tax systems that are more favorable 
to their interests. 
 
One reason that the income and wealth of the rich are under-taxed is the many loopholes 
that they enjoy. Another is the poor enforcement of tax laws. The IMF Independent 
Evaluation Office has recently recognized these problems: “stronger and parallel efforts 
[to the VAT] should be made at improving collections, curtailing discretionary 
exemptions, and reducing tax evasion—particularly [for] direct taxes (personal and 
corporate)…” In the same context, it also noted that “efforts by the IMF in this area have 
not been forceful enough…, particularly if they affect powerful vested interests” (IMF 
2003, p. 10). 
 
Another reason for under-taxation of income and wealth is the systematic weakening of 
vertical equity as an essential component of tax systems. The tax rates for richer 
households are being significantly lowered relative to those for poorer households—all in 
the name of being more efficient in generating revenue. Vertical equity is being 
redefined, perversely, to mean that tax systems should concentrate on not making the 
poor poorer. Making the rich poorer is regarded as an ill-advised, and ultimately futile, 
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exercise (Thirsk 1997). Tax systems have left the rich off the hook because conventional 
wisdom now regards taxes as an inefficient means to redistribute income. But this 
opinion is based on the assumption that tax systems should not concentrate on making the 
rich pay their fair share of taxes—even the share that tax systems mandate that they 
should pay. Frequently, the main problem is a lack of enforcement. 
 
For the same reasons, taxes on corporate income are in marked decline in many parts of 
the developing world, despite the fact that they have contributed, on average, more 
revenue than personal income taxes. In Latin America, for example, corporate income 
taxes as a share of total tax revenue dropped from 15.1 per cent in 1990-1994 to 12.2 per 
cent in 1995-1999 (Stotsky and Wolde Mariam 2002). 
 
One indication of the trend towards less vertical equity is the lack of taxation of wealth. 
In many countries, taxes on property, an immobile and often easily identifiable form of 
wealth, are a relatively untapped source of revenue, particularly at the level of local 
government. This is certainly the case for residential and commercial real estate. But little 
effort is undertaken to register and properly value such property.  
 
The upshot of these trends in taxation is that tax systems are becoming less progressive, 
not more progressive. This direction undermines progress on the MDGs since rendering 
tax systems less equitable will nullify the effort to achieve a more equitable, poverty-
focused allocation of public expenditures. 
 
A big priority for progressive tax reform is to re-assert vertical equity as a basic principle 
of taxation. This would involve tilting the composition of taxes away from regressive 
consumption taxes and towards progressive income and wealth taxes. In industrial 
countries, the ratio of income to consumption taxes is more than double that of 
developing countries (Tanzi and Zee 2001). This ratio should be used as a long-term 
benchmark for reforming tax systems in developing countries. 
 
Up-Scaling Public Investment Will Drive MDG Progress 
 
Public investment is a crucial means to stimulate growth and focus resources on the poor. 
Such investment is not the enemy of private investment but its prerequisite. Since it is 
essential for building basic social and physical infrastructure, it is fundamental to 
achieving substantial progress on the MDGs. When well-designed public investment 
boosts the productivity of labor and capital, it stimulates more private investment instead 
of ‘crowding it out ’, as is often mistakenly claimed. 
 
Many developing countries are stuck in slow-growth doldrums. To stimulate growth, 
they need to implement more expansionary fiscal policies. Increased public investment is 
crucial, not only because it injects more demand into a stagnant economy but also 
because it expands an economy’s productive capacity.  
 
Private-sector development will stall without public investment. When growth is 
stagnant, so are profits; and when profits languish, so does private investment—domestic 
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or foreign. But current policies still artificially pit public investment against private 
investment. The result: a general slowdown in investment. 
 
In all developing countries, the average annual rate of growth of gross capital formation 
(which includes both public and private investment) slowed from 2.1 per cent during 
1980-90 to 1.7 per cent during 1990-2002. In low-income countries, where investment 
growth is critical to reaching the MDGs, the growth rate slowed from 4.7 per cent to 4.2 
per cent. In lower middle- income countries, the rate dropped precipitously from 3.4 per 
cent to 0.3 per cent (World Bank 2004b).  
 
In developing countries as a whole, private household consumption has been spurring 
growth. While growth of investment was slowing during 1990-2002, the rate of growth 
of household consumption was accelerating from 2.9 per cent to 3.7 per cent. But 
consumption-based growth cannot sustain itself over the long term. Consumption is not 
an independent factor: it depends on increases in income or borrowing. Inevitably, 
growth will have to slow. In the meantime, economies remain particularly vulnerable to 
shocks and setbacks. 
 
Many economists argue against expansionary fiscal policies in developing countries 
despite their desperate need for public investment. But the same economists do not object 
when huge tax breaks are lavished on the rich in some developed countries. 
Unfortunately, the multiplier impact of a tax cut on an economy is, on average, half as 
powerful as that of an equivalent increase in public expenditure (Henning, Kell and 
Mahfouz 2002). If the rich get the benefits, the impact is even weaker because of slower 
growth in aggregate demand . A better alternative: increase public investment and make 
sure that much of it benefits the poor. 
 
Expansionary fiscal policy can take various forms. It can be consumption-led or 
investment- led. It can also be public led or private-sector led (Pollin 1998). Governments 
could use tax reductions to immediately increase private consumption—at least among 
formal sector workers who pay taxes. However, part of the multiplier impact of this 
increase can leak out of the economy if the consumption is focused on imports. Certainly, 
if the rich receive the tax breaks, they are more likely to consume imported luxury items. 
Also, a consumption-led expansion is more likely to be associated with rising inflation 
since the supply capacities of the economy are not be expanded in tandem with the 
expansion of aggregate demand. 
 
Governments could also emphasize stimulating private investment as the primary 
expansionary factor. However, the policy tools that government can employ to stimulate 
private investment are relatively weak (Pollin 1998). Monetary authorities can seek to 
lower short-term interest rates, with the hope that these will bring down the long-term 
interests rates that influence investment decisions. However, there is little guarantee that 
long-term rates will be reduced and that even if they were, they would spark private 
investment. The effects on private investment of tax breaks, such as tax credits or capital 
gains tax cuts, are also uncertain. 
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The advantages of using public investment to spur economic expansions outweigh those 
for using private investment or consumption. The import content of public investment 
can be influenced. Also, public investment serves to expand the supply capacities of an 
economy. Furthermore, public investment can be used to focus resources on regions of 
the country or sectors of the economy where the poor are concentrated. Thus, it can 
directly serve poverty reduction purposes.  
 
For the above reasons, expanding public investment is preferable to expanding public 
consumption, even though the latter can also have a multiplier impact on the economy. 
Public consumption, such as social welfare programmes, can also be directed towards the 
poor. However, the medium- term multiplier impact of public investment on the economy 
is stronger than that of public consumption, and is less likely to increase inflation. 
 
Despite the pressing need for more public investment, it remains low where it should be 
high, namely, in low- income countries with under-supplied public goods. As a 
percentage of GDP, public investment should be above 5 per cent in most developing 
countries, but many of them fall short of this threshold. In Peru, this ratio is 2.6 per cent, 
in Pakistan, it is 2.5 per cent; in India, 1.6; in Cameroon, 1.1 per cent; and in Georgia, a 
mere 0.4 per cent (World Bank 2000 and 2001). Also, the output elasticity of public 
capital is likely to be high in many low- income countries, where the stock of capital—
such as roads, electrical grids and irrigation works—is low. Such capital is also likely to 
have a persistent impact on growth through a cumulative effect on raising productivity 
and sustaining employment. 
 
Although it should be increasing, public investment is declining in many countries. In the 
South Asia region, for example, capital expenditures were, on average, only nine per cent 
of total public expenditures in 2002—down from 12 per cent in 1990 (World Bank 
2004). In Europe and the CIS, the share of capital expenditures in 2002 had dropped 
dramatically, also to only nine per cent. 
 
In many countries, there has been a secular decline of public investment since 1980. 
Table 2 contains data for selected countries on the ratio of public capital expenditures to 
GDP for 1980, 1990 and 1998. In Indonesia, for example, public capital expenditures as 
a ratio to GDP dropped from 10.4 per cent in 1980 to 5.7 per cent in 1998. During this 
same period, this ratio dropped from 12.1 per cent to 5.7 per cent in Jordan and from 16.6 
per cent to 6.3 per cent in Sri Lanka. 
 
One recent study of public investment trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (using consistent 
time series data for 15 countries) indicates that it has been in secular decline since the 
early 1970s. While public investment as a percentage of GDP ranged between five and 
six per cent in the 1970s, it had dropped to three to four per cent in 1990-2001 (Weeks  
2004). Taking capital depreciation into account would highlight the predicament of many 
African countries: they are unable to even maintain their infrastructure, much less expand 




Table 2. Public Capital Expenditures as a Ratio to GDP (%) 
Countries 1980 1990 1998 
Burundi 10.9 11.8 3.7 
Cameroon 5.2 5.5 1.1* 
Guatemala 5.1 -- 2.3* 
Indonesia 10.4 8.0 5.7 
India 1.4 1.8 1.6 
Jordan 12.1 5.8 5.7 
Kenya 5.9 5.5 3.4 
Pakistan 3.1 2.6 2.5 
Peru 4.4 1.3 2.6 
Philippines 3.4 3.1 2.2 
Sri Lanka 16.6 6.1 5.3 
Zimbabwe 1.4 2.8 2.1 
Sources: World Development Reports 1999/2000 and 2000/2001, Table 14. Note: ‘*’ signifies 1997.  
 
The quantity of public investment is not, of course, the only important issue. Its quality is 
also critical. Large public investment programmes are not, by definition, a productive use 
of public resources. Rent-seeking is one major problem that affects their efficiency. 
There are also important design features. If such programmes use capital- intensive 
methods of production, rely on large contractors or depend heavily on imported 
materials, then their benefits could be marginal (Griffin 2001). For efficiency as well as 
equity purposes, public investment projects that are employment-intensive, hire small 
and medium-sized contractors and use local suppliers of materials could often utilize 
public resources more optimally. The quality of public investment also includes its 
impact on poverty. As already indicated, public investment can be critical for focusing 
resources directly on the poor. China’s Great Western Development Strategy is a good 
recent example of focusing public investment on poor regions.  
 
Also, public investment needs to be more diversified. It is critical not just for basic 
education and health—on which everyone now agrees—but also for such essential 
infrastructure as rural roads, energy and irrigation. In most countries, increasing growth 
cannot benefit the poor without more rural and agricultural development, especially in 
more remote or backward areas. This is precisely where public investment on critical 
economic infrastructure is most needed, and most often lacking. 
 
Tight Inflation Targets Hold Back MDG Progress 
 
National policymakers should aim for income stability as well as price stability—
employment targeting as well as inflation targeting. Slow growth and low employment 
hurt the poor more than anyone else. Inflation is certainly not their only problem. 
Moderate inflation can, in fact, be compatible with growth. But low inflation can be as 
harmful as high inflation. When low- inflation policies keep the economy mired in 
stagnation or drive it into recession, the poor lose out, often for years thereafter, as their 
meager stocks of wealth are wiped out or their human capabilities seriously impaired. 
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Money is too important to be left to central bankers (as Milton Friedman once stated) 
(Chowdhury 2004). Without jobs and income, people cannot benefit from price stability. 
Inflation targets cannot be set independently by technocrats but must be determined 
through government-wide, democratic decision-making, weighing the importance of 
price stability vis-à-vis other objectives such as output and employment stability (Epstein 
2003). The monetary technocrats can then be left to craft the means to achieve the agreed 
public objectives. 
 
Most developing countries have been advised to reduce annual inflation to a 3-5 per cent 
range—a usual requirement for external loans. Also, many national central banks have 
been given the independence to achieve this monetary goal, despite any adverse 
consequences for growth, employment and poverty. Apparently, some economic policies 
are too important to be subject to democratic decision-making.  
 
But there should be more open debate and decision-making about policies of such 
significance. However, central bank independence—for determining goals as well as 
methods— is staunchly defended by neoliberal orthodoxy. In fact, one indicator that is 
used to gauge such independence is the number of times that central bank governors are 
replaced. According to this perspective, the fewer times that they are replaced, the better 
(Rogoff 2003). However, this can hardly be considered a hallmark of democratic 
governance. 
 
In recent years, inflation has declined to its lowest level since the 1960s (Kumar et al. 
2003; Rogoff 2003). Over just ten years, global CPI inflation dropped from about 30 per 
cent to almost four per cent (Table 3). During 2000-2003, yearly CPI inflation was 2.0 
per cent in industrial countries and 5.7 per cent in developing countries. In Asia, it had 
sunk as low as 2.3 per cent. (See Table 4 for further data on individual countries).  
 
Table 3. Global Trends in CPI Inflation (% per year) 
Category 1980-84 1985-89 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-03 
World 14.1 15.5 30.4 8.4 4.1 
Industrial Countries 8.7 3.9 3.8 2.0 2.0 
Developing Countries 31.4 48.0 53.2 13.1 5.7 
Source: Rogoff 2003, Table 1. 
 
Until recently, the main problem for one fourth of all countries, especially in Asia, was 
not inflation but deflation—a sustained drop in the general price level. A major cause has 
been their slow economic growth, which has driven down prices by dampening the 
demand for goods and services. By contrast, some orthodox economists laud conservative 
anti- inflation central banks for contributing decisively to such dramatic disinflation. They 
also cite globalization and rapid liberalization, which have supposedly helped eliminate 
domestic monopoly pricing, as additional important factors (Rogoff 2003). 
 
There is no evidence, however, that very low inflation is good for growth. Many studies 
confirm that moderate inflation—ranging between 5 and 15 per cent annually, if not 
higher—correlates well with growth (Chowdhury 2004; Bruno and Easterly 1998). The 
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new ‘politically correct’ justification for minimizing inflation is that it hurts the poor. 
However, this misreads the facts: very high, destabilizing inflation (above 40 per cent) 
definitely hurts the poor; and very low inflation (below 5 per cent) can also harm their 
interests when it impedes growth and employment.  
 
When central banks try to squelch inflation, the economy is often driven into a 
‘stabilization trap’. Looming on the horizon is deflation, a self-reinforcing downward 
spiral of prices, profits, output and employment. When deflation sets in, expansionary 
fiscal policy is definitely the best response because it can have a powerful immediate 




Table 4. Inflation Rates in Selected Countries 
(CPI Yearly Inflation Rate, 2000-2003) 
Country Inflation Rate Country Inflation Rate 
Algeria 2.5 Maldives 1.0 
Armenia 1.4 Morocco 1.8 
Azerbaijan 2.2 Niger 2.5 
Bolivia 2.4 Oman -0.1 
Burkina Faso 2.6 Panama 0.9 
Cambodia 1.6 Peru 2.1 
China 0.1 Senegal 2.0 
Congo, Rep. Of 1.6 Sierra Leone 0.6 
Egypt 2.7 Singapore 0.7 
Ethiopia -1.4 Taiwan Province 0.3 
Gabon 1.2 Thailand 1.4 
Jordan 1.7 Tunisia 2.8 
Lebanon 0.8 Uganda 2.4 
Malaysia 1.8 Vietnam 1.4 
Source: Rogoff 2003, Table A.1 
 
Many countries have now adopted ‘inflation targeting’ as their chief macroeconomic 
policy. This means setting both monetary and fiscal policies to maintain price inflation 
rates within a target range (often 3-5 per cent per year). According to this perspective, 
inflation is caused by excessive aggregate demand, not by cost factors. Inflation can also 
be caused, secondarily, by expectations about its future rate. Hence, by publicly 
announcing an inflation target, monetary authorities hope to control such expectations. 
Monetary policy is regarded as the main instrument to control inflation and interest rates 
(not the money supply) as the main tool of monetary policy.  
 
Even Central Banks that do not exclusively adopt inflation targeting still tend to neglect 
changes in real variables, such as output and employment. The main reason is that 
Central Banks are evaluated primarily on their ability to control inflation, not on their 
ability to maintain output stability or stimulate economic growth (Arestis and Sawyer 
2003). The rationale given for such a bias is that politicians tend to favor the growth of 
 17 
employment and income so central bankers should counter-act this tendency by focusing 
on maintaining low inflation.  
 
Unfortunately, an inflation-targeting approach subordinates fiscal policy to monetary 
policy. Monetary policy leads and fiscal policy is forced to align itself with the monetary 
stance, particularly by avoiding fiscal deficits. Monetary policy (i.e., interest rate policy) 
is postulated to affect only inflation, not any real variables. However, the interest rate can 
have an effect on investment decisions, particularly if the real rate is very high. Hence, 
monetary policy can, indeed, affect real variables, such as the capital stock, and thus the 
long-term rate of growth of an economy. Money is not ‘neutral’ with respect to the real 
economy, as the inflation-targeting approach often claims.  
 
Moreover, because this approach constrains the use of fiscal policy, policymakers have 
little ability to maintain output stability. When inflation is exacerbated by cost factors, 
such as the rising price of imported oil, inflation-targeting central bankers have only one 
option: dramatically increase real rates of interest and plunge the economy into a 
recession.  
 
But drastic disinflation, which is intended to drive down nominal wages and thereby 
eventually restore employment, usually has the opposite effect (Palley 2004). The fall of 
output prices caused by a recession amplifies the problem of unemployment as firms, 
now unable to recover their production costs, cut output even further. This causes wages 
to fall. Widespread structural reforms that have increased wage flexibility exacerbate this 
tendency. With unions and labor legislation weakened, workers have little protection 
from wage losses (and reap smaller benefits from any recovery).  
 
Falling wages also exacerbate the debt burden of workers. Because debtors tend to have 
lower incomes than creditors, they have a higher propensity to consume. Thus, their loss 
of income contributes an additional factor that lowers aggregate demand. Increased price 
and wage flexibility only worsen the downward spiral of aggregate demand. At this point, 
strong counter-cyclical fiscal policies are necessary to spark a recovery. Even the IMF 
has begun to recognize the need for counter-cyclical fiscal policies in situations—not 
uncommon now—in which their fiscal adjustment programmes have proven incapable of 
stimulating private investment demand (IMF 2003, p. 3). 
 
Linking PRSPs to MDGs has implications not only for macroeconomic policies and 
public finance but also for structural economic reforms. This paper concludes with 
sections on two such structural reforms, financial liberalization and privatization. It 
begins with financial liberalization. 
 
Financial Deregulation Impairs Investment and Poverty Reduction  
 
Unfettered financial deregulation has dampened investment and adversely affected the 
poor. Contrary to the widespread liberalization mania, the evidence points to the need for 
greater regulation of the financial sector, including foreign short-term borrowing, in order 
to promote greater economic stability and more equitable access to financial services 
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(Chandrasekhar 2004). The IMF now acknowledges that capital account liberalization 
has exacerbated economic volatility (Prasad et al. 2003). But the record of domestic 
financial liberalization has also been poor. 
 
Liberalization, both domestic and external, has caused huge setbacks to MDG progress. 
The financial sector is crucial to mobilizing domestic resources and channeling them to 
productive investment. If ill-advised economic reforms impair this function, growth will 
stall and poverty reduction will slow. Instead of addressing problems affecting the entire 
financial sector, the international donor community has allowed itself to be diverted into 
focusing on a small segment of it, namely, microfinance. 
 
While the poor still lack systematic access to credit, microfinance alone cannot solve this 
problem. While poor workers need jobs, the businesses that could employ them cannot 
get the loans they need to start-up or expand their operations. In addition to backing 
micro- finance, international donors should encourage public-sector support to rural 
banking systems and financial institutions serving small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). If SMEs in urban centres and rural areas cannot obtain access to credit, the 
decent-paying jobs needed to reduce poverty will be lacking. 
 
The record of financial liberalization has been, in fact, neither pro-growth nor pro-poor. It 
has been one of the most disastrous components of the neoliberal reform agenda. One 
central barometer of its failure has been that in many countries, real interest rates have 
risen and the spread between the deposit and lending rates has widened. Table 5 provides 
relevant data on interest rates for selected countries.  
 
Because of rising interest rates, borrowing by firms for productive investment has been 
seriously impeded. Banks have concentrated their activities in a few urban areas, 
depriving the rural population of access to financial services. Although aggregate 
financial ‘deepening’ looks like it might have improved, access to credit has become 
more—not less—inequitable. The ill-advised dismantling of development banks, a major 
source of finance for long-term investment in many developing countries, has likely 
contributed to these problems. 
 
While national policymakers have been encouraged to focus on microfinance (as the 
main weapon to combat poverty), they should seek to address more directly the 
fundamental problems created by unregulated financial institutions. Without state 
support, for example, rural banking systems often collapse under liberalization. Farmers 
and non- farm enterprises are denied access to the credit that is crucial to reducing 
poverty.  
 
Long-term investment is constrained as commercial banks focus more on short-term 
lending, such as for consumer durables or working capital. The inflow of speculative 
capital only exacerbates the short-term horizon of investors. Without stronger regulation 
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Armenia 9.6 21.1 18.5 
Bangladesh 8.2 16.0 12.4 
Bolivia 9.6 20.6 17.5 
Cambodia 2.5 16.2 12.8 
Cameroon 5.0 18.0 17.2 
CAR 5.0 18.0 16.3 
Gabon 5.0 18.0 11.4 
Honduras 13.7 22.7 15.5 
Kyrgyz Republic 5.9 24.8 22.0 
Lao PDR 6.0 29.3 18.4 
Mongolia 13.2 28.4 21.1 
Nicaragua 7.3 23.2 17.0 
Tanzania 3.3 16.4 11.8 
Uganda 5.6 19.1 23.1 
Zambia 23.3 45.2 21.1 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004b. Table 5.7 
 
Under liberalization, banks and corporations have resorted more to short-term external 
borrowing, making the country more vulnerable to short-term capital flight and the havoc 
that it can wreak in times of crisis. When the economy is booming, ‘hot money’ rushes in 
to make a quick profit, but this sows the seeds of financial instability. When the crisis 
hits, it can rock economies to their foundations. Recent financial crises have caused 
unprecedented losses for countries. For example, during the Asia Financial Crisis, the 
cumulative GDP difference between a country’s previous trend rate of growth and its 
actual lower rate during 1999-2002 was huge in several countries. The cumulative GDP 
shortfall from trend was 27 per cent for the Republic of Korea, 57 per cent for Thailand 
and 82 per cent for Indonesia (Arestis 2003). Despite these disasters, unfettered financial 
liberalization continues as a standard conditionality of structural adjustment programmes. 
 
Privatizing Public Services: The Adverse MDG Effects 
 
Privatizing public services runs the danger of undercutting progress towards the MDGs. 
The mixed development record of privatization casts serious doubts on its choice as the 
invariably best option for promoting the public interest. However, lender conditionalities 
invariably promote it, lauding it as though it were a goal of development (Bayliss 2002). 
Instead, national policymakers should have the latitude to examine a range of policy 
options, including restructured public-sector provision and public-led partnerships with 
the private sector, as well as full-scale privatization.  
 
Success in privatizing public-sector enterprises is often due more to a competitive 
environment and public regulatory capacity than changes in forms of ownership. In key 
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instances, maintaining public ownership and restructuring the public provision of services 
might be, indeed. the best option. The ultimate test in judging each modality is whether it 
is the most effective in promoting development goals. The contribution of such structural 
reforms to advancing progress towards the MDGs is the key litmus test.  
 
The justification for privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public services often 
assumes that private firms are more efficient, provide better-quality services to more 
people and charge more competitive prices. The evidence on improved efficiency—often 
cited as the strongest claim for privatization—is mixed, especially if private firms are 
compared, as they should be, to restructured public firms (Dagdeviren and Fine 2004).  
 
The argument that privatization contributes to better access and quality is even weaker, 
particularly with regard to the provision of essential public services. In Africa, for 
example, privatization of public utilities has a sorry record in some cases (Barthelemy et 
al. 2003). The privatization of water and power, for example, has led to higher, not lower 
tariffs because of the need for firms to cover large sunk costs. Without proper regulation, 
these privatized utilities have kept investments low and deprived rural communities and 
the urban poor of access to electric power and water supply—all in order to maximize 
their monopoly profits.  
 
This indicates that privatized firms do not necessarily charge competitive prices. The 
scramble for special government favors (‘rent-seeking’) still characterizes many 
privatized enterprises, particularly if they enjoy a monopoly position. ‘Corruption’ can be 
just as much a problem (if not more so) in private firms as in public. 
 
One of the main justifications for privatization is that governments will save public 
money, which they can then supposedly use to promote the public good, particularly 
poverty reduction. This is a curious, roundabout way of justifying privatization. Part of 
the reason might be the unstated recognition that privatized firms are not very concerned 
with providing coverage to the poor.  
 
But even this justification should be viewed critically. The fiscal payoff to privatization 
may well be exaggerated. The process itself is complex and expensive. The costs 
(including administrative costs and compensation to employees) often outweigh the  
benefits (the proceeds from fire-sale prices of public wealth).  
 
While a significant proportion of state-owned enterprises are profit-making, they also 
often happen to be the first to be sold, with the consequent loss of yearly profit income 
for the state. Moreover, little is known about the amount of tax revenue that these 
privatized firms contribute to the state. At the same time, the continuing costs of 
regulating them can be substantial. Ironically, states supposedly too weak to run effective 
SOEs are  assumed strong enough to regulate these firms when, being privatized, they are 
more difficult to influence (Kessler 2003). The state continues to bear a much heavier 
fiscal burden for privatization than initially imagined by neoliberal reformers. 
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Most importantly, the poor are likely to pay a disproportionately high cost for rapid and 
poorly designed liberalization. Little research has been conducted on the distributional 
impact of privatization, particularly on poverty. Privatizing essential public services 
could, in fact, slow MDG progress unless private firms are heavily subsidized to maintain 
services for poor customers (see Nixson and Walters 2003 on Mongolia). And if big state 
subsidies are necessary, what was the point of privatization? Cross subsid ies (from rich 
customers to poor) are standard practice for public firms providing essential services. 
 
Also, SOEs often account for a significant share of formal-sector employment, where 
decent labor standards prevail. Privatization can lead to both a big drop in formal-sector 
employment and a weakening of the trade unions that set the national pattern for job 
protection and pay. In sum, privatization’s advantages are likely to have been inflated 
while its disadvantages have been conveniently under-estimated. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has drawn out the implications for economic policies of basing Poverty 
Reduction Strategies on the MDG strategic framework. It recognizes some of the 
weaknesses inherent in an ODA-driven development process but seeks to correct them 
through a heightened emphasis on domestic resource mobilization and a concerted effort 
to develop state capacities. In order to advance ‘national ownership’ of the development 
agenda, the paper also seeks to spark a broader policy dialogue—based on creating wider 
policy choice—on the macroeconomic and adjustment policies that govern Poverty 
Reduction Strategies.  
 
With regard to fiscal policies, it addresses two major themes: 1) the need to significantly 
augment public revenue in order to finance public services and infrastructure that are 
essential to underpin progress towards the MDGs and 2) based on increasing both 
domestic and external financing, the need to dramatically scale up comprehensive public 
investment programmes.  
 
In arguing for mobilizing more public revenue, the paper emphasizes doing it more 
equitably— namely, re-asserting vertical equity as a core guiding principle of tax systems. 
And in stressing the importance of public investment, the paper counters the neoliberal 
view that such expenditure will ‘crowd out’ private investment. It argues, on the contrary, 
that by enhancing the productivity of labour and capital, public investment can stimulate 
private investment. Moreover, even when a large inflow of ODA finances such public 
investment, it is possible, the paper contends, to counter-act the tendency of the exchange 
rate to appreciate and thereby undercut the competitiveness of exports. The solution 
comes from the expansion of the productive capacities of the economy, especially in the 
sectors producing tradable goods. 
 
With regard to monetary policies, the paper maintains that in many countries, 
unnecessarily restrictive inflation targets are hampering growth and employment 
generation. It argues that any targets for macroeconomic stabilization, such as inflation 
rates, should be supplemented with targets for real variables, such as real growth in 
income, increased employment or greater reduction in income poverty. Monetary policies 
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should not dominate national economic policymaking; instead, they should accommodate 
expansionary, investment-focused fiscal policies. 
 
With regard to financial policies, the paper maintains that rampant deregulation has 
hindered investment and directly hurt the poor. It claims that real rates of interest have 
risen in the wake of financial liberalization and dampened lending for productive 
investment. Since commercial banks have withdrawn from what they regard as 
unprofitable lending in rural areas, the access to credit has become more inequitable. In 
order to overcome these adverse developments, the paper maintains that national 
policymakers should prioritize public-sector support to rural banking systems, specialized 
financial institutions for SMEs and development banking services for long-term 
investment. 
 
With regard to privatization, the paper argues that it has had, a best, a mixed development 
record—one that is, indeed, incommensurate with the unqualified donor support that it 
has received. The paper claims that privatization does not necessarily have a better track 
record than public-sector provision in promoting efficiency, quality services, lower prices 
or broader access. It is not even clear, the paper contends, that the public sector has 
gained much net income from selling state owned enterprises. The dangers of privatizing 
public services are particularly pronounced, since universal, affordable access to such 
services is critical to reaching many of the MDGs. 
 
In sum, the paper contends that the economic policies under-girding ‘Second-Generation’ 
PRSPs—namely, PRSPs firmly anchored in an MDG framework—should be less fixated 
on macroeconomic stabilization and more geared to stimulating rapid growth and long-
term human development. Unless economic policies are revamped along these lines, and 
fully backed up  with ample development resources, the prospects for reaching the MDGs 
will remain remote. And PRSPs will remain short-term, tactical instruments designed 
primarily to legitimize stabilization measures and set up social safety nets in order to 
mitigate the inevitable adverse consequences for poverty. 
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